by Ethan Kovnat

Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong’s view of ontology is rather problematic. This is by no means a unique observation; Meinong’s response to the Riddle of Nonbeing is very effectively refuted by W. V. O. Quine’s Man in the Doorway argument.¹ However, it seems to me that when we limit Meinong’s ontology so that it applies specifically to fictional entities, we are left with a plausible view that allows us to engage in all types of fictional discourse.

The Meinongian ontology initially appears to be a compelling solution to the Puzzle of Nonexistent Objects. The Puzzle of Nonexistent Objects, or “Plato’s Beard,” as Quine called it, can be stated as follows:

1. In order to coherently refute an entity’s existence, one must reference said entity.
2. One cannot coherently reference an entity that lacks any quality of existence
3. Therefore, one cannot coherently refute any entity’s existence.²

Meinong’s solution to this puzzle is, in my view, an ingenious one. According to Meinong, the flaw in this argument is in the second premise, which inaccurately conflates “existence” with “being.” Meinong argued that all entities possess the property of being, but not all entities possess the property of existence. Thus, when we reference a nonexistent entity, we are referencing an entity that possesses the property or being, perhaps along with many other traits, but lacks the property of physical existence. This means that such an entity can be coherently referenced, and its existence coherently refuted.³

Personally, I am very sympathetic to this view, as I appreciate its elegant simplicity in tackling a serious metaphysical dilemma. However, Quine makes a compelling case that this ontology as Meinong conceived of it is implausible. Quine’s strongest objection to Meinong is, I think, the Man in the Doorway argument. This argument is based on Quine’s claim that any entity must possess certain objective, defined characteristics, per the slogan “No entity without identity.⁴” This causes a problem when Meinong’s ontology commits us to believing in ambiguous entities. Quine uses the example of a theoretical man in the doorway to illustrate this point. Aside from the fact that the aforementioned entity is both a man and located in the doorway, we know nothing about his characteristics. Nearly everything about him is completely undefined. Therefore, according to Quine, we cannot accept the reality of this entity, even though Meinong says we must. We cannot accept this man as an entity when he possesses no identity.⁵ I, for one, must side with Quine on this issue; we cannot accept the metaphysical reality of every possible conceivable entity. Doing so creates a crowded, unwieldy ontology which does not advance us in our search for metaphysical truth.

However, when we limit the Meinongian approach so that it only applies to fictional entities, rather than all abstract entities, we find something much more plausible. But before I defend a Meinongian understanding of fictional entities, I must first illustrate why such an understanding is desirable. Centrally, it seems evident that understanding fictional entities through the lens of Meinong allows us to coherently reference fictional entities in any type of discourse, thus resolving the Puzzle of Fictional Discourse.

The Puzzle of Fictional Discourse arises from the fact that fictional entities can be discussed in four potentially contradictory ways. These types of fictional discourse can be described as follows:

1. Fictionalizing discourse, which is discussion about a fictional entity within a work of fiction itself.
   
2. Non-existence claims, which are claims a fictional entity lacks physical or “real” existence.
   
3. Internal discourse, which is discussion about a fictional entity’s traits by those of us who possess physical or “real” existence.
   
4. External discourse, which is discussion about a fictional entity that acknowledges its “real” world history, as well as its fictionality.⁶
   

These types of discourse create a puzzle because claims that can be said to be correct per one type of discourse might not be correct per another type of discourse. For instance, it is correct per internal discourse to say “Bilbo Baggins is three feet tall,”⁷ but this is not necessarily correct per external discourse, since Bilbo Baggins is a fictional entity invented by J. R. R. Tolkein, and lacks the physical dimension of height.

The Meinongian view of fictional entities is that this view eliminates this contradiction by treating fictional entities as Meinongian abstract objects, which is suitable when describing fictional entities using any of these types of discourse. The Meinongian view lends itself particularly well to fictionalizing discourse and internal discourse, since Meinongian abstract objects are capable of possessing traits. This frames fictionalizing discourse and internal discourse as simply the descriptions of an abstract object’s traits. Importantly, this understanding does not contradict true claims in external discourse, since external discourse can be thought of as claims about how an abstract object interacts with the physical world. For instance, there is no contradiction in saying that in 1937, J. R. R. Tolkein created an abstract entity called Bilbo Baggins, which possesses the trait of having been born in the year 2890 of the Third Age of Middle Earth. Similarly, nonexistence claims create no contradiction per this view, since a Meinongian can simply say that although the entity known as Bilbo Baggins possesses many traits, these traits do not include the trait of physical existence, which is a concept made explicitly possible by Meinong’s ontology. Just as Meinong creates a simple and elegant solution of the Puzzle of Abstract Objects, he creates a simple and elegant solution to the Puzzle of Fictional Discourse.

But, of course, Meinong’s broader ontology is not sustainable, as it falls prey to Quine’s Man in the Doorway argument. This might seem to make a Meinongian view of fictional discourse equally unsustainable, but I would argue that a more limited view of Meinong’s ontology that applies only to fictional entities, rather than all abstract entities, is entirely plausible. Quine’s Man in the Doorway argument rests on the fact that Meinong’s broader ontology entails the existence of entities without identity, since per Meinong, any entity we can reference must possess being, even if said entity lacks a defined identity. However, this objection does not apply to fictional entities, since a fictional entity must have an identity. Take Bilbo Baggins, for example. We know quite a lot about Bilbo: he was born on September 22, 2890 t.a. in the town of Hobbiton in the Shire; he is not son of Drogo Baggins and Belladonna Baggins (née Took); his maternal grandfather Gerontius Took, better known as the Old Took was once the Thain of the Shire, as were many of Bilbo’s adventurous ancestors on his Took side; when Bilbo was a child, he befriended the wizard Gandalf, whose fireworks he particularly enjoyed; at the age of 50, he accompanied Gandalf and thirteen dwarves on a quest to slay a dragon; etc..⁸ Through internal discourse, Bilbo Baggins undoubtedly gains enough identity to be considered a Quinean entity. This Man in the Doorway is not undefined: I can describe his short stature, his curly hair, and his hairy feet.⁹ ¹⁰

Admittedly, not every fictional entity can be expected to be as well-defined as our Mr. Baggins, but every fictional entity can be said to have some sort of identity developed through internal discourse. Even the simplest fictional entity, if it has a story attached to it, must possess an identity through its role in that story. The key is to delineate a mere abstract entity from a fictional entity, which, I am forced to concede, is a challenging and nonobvious endeavor. That being said, I think a reasonable distinction to draw between fictional and merely abstract entities is whether or not they play a role in a narrative. Quine’s Man in the Doorway, for instance, is merely an abstract entity rather than fictional entity because he is merely hypothetical. The Man in the Doorway has no story, he is simply a possible man. A fictional entity, however, like Bilbo Baggins, has a role to play in a narrative, through which he develops identity. Once again, I must concede that what exactly constitutes a narrative is similarly difficult to determine, but I believe that citing the concept of a narrative is sufficient to differentiate fictional entities from entities that are abstract but not well-enough defined to be fictional.

Despite the flaws in his ontology, I believe there to be value in a Meinongian understanding of abstract entities. Even if Meinong’s views require some modification if they are to be plausible, I find it satisfying that a limited application of Meinong’s ontology can be useful in understanding a key metaphysical puzzle. Perhaps Meinong was too ambitious in creating his broad ontological theory, but he certainly did not entirely miss the mark.

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1. Ney 35
2. Ney 31
3. Ney 32
4. Ney 35
5. Ney 35
6. Thomasson 11
7. Kocurek
8. Tolkien Gateway
9. Tolkien Gateway
10. Note: the biographical and descriptive information about Bilbo Baggins was taken from the Tolkien Gateway, which is a wiki. Although wikis are not generally considered reliable sources, I believe it is acceptable to cite a wiki in this particular case. A fictional object’s identity is defined by our collective understanding of that object’s traits, so the fact that anyone can edit a wiki does not make a wiki an unreliable source because the collaborative nature of such a website ensures that its description of a fictional entity represents a collective understanding of that entity.

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Bibliography

“Bilbo Baggins – Tolkien Gateway.” Bilbo Baggins. Tolkien Gateway. Accessed October 9, 2021. http://tolkiengateway.net/wiki/Bilbo_Baggins.

Kocurek, Alexander. “Logic, Argumentation, and Ontology.” Philosophy 2640: Introduction to Metaphysics. Class lecture at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, September 2, 2021 .

Ney, Alyssa. “An Introduction to Ontology.” Essay. In Metaphysics: An Introduction, 30–59. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014.

Thomasson, Amie L. “Fictional Entities.” Accessed October 9, 2021. https://uh.edu/~garson/Thomasson%20-%20Fictional%20Entities.pdf.